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We were brothers all 
In honour, as in one community 
(William Wordsworth, The Prelude) 
 
 
 
I Introduction 
Ed Miliband’s victory as Labour leader in September 2010 focused attention, once again, on the 
internal politics of the Labour party and on the operation of the electoral college that determined 
the outcome of the contest. Among other matters, press reports concentrated on the intense and at 
times acrimonious struggle between Ed Miliband and his brother David that had shaped the contest, 
the narrow margin of the former’s victory, and the role that affiliated trade unions had, arguably, 
played in determining the result. Though there has been subsequent academic discussion of the 
leadership election (for example, Dorey and Denham 2010; Jobson and Wickham-Jones 2011), there 
has been no detailed analysis of the initial nominations for candidates or of the results in the context 
of the specific workings of Labour’s electoral college – an institution at one time seen to confer a 
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moderating role to party’s affiliated unions by which they would stabilise warring factions (Minkin 
1991: 357). In this article we fill this gap, raising questions about the nominations process, the 
ideological divide between candidates, and about the electoral college, the answers to which 
invalidate hitherto key assumptions (for example that union nominations would not help to shape 
outcomes) and raise significant issues for the party in terms of both candidate selection and the 
electoral process.   
 
The Labour leader is chosen by an electoral college made up of three, equally weighted parts (for the 
origins see Seyd, 1988, 119-125; and Minkin, 1991, 334-57; for a narrative survey of the mechanism 
see Heppell, 2010; for the political context see Hayter, 2005; and Shaw, 1994). The first comprises 
members of parliament (MPs) and members of the European parliament (MEPs), the second 
individual members of the party, and the third members of affiliated organisations, including trade 
unions, who (following a reform in 1993) vote on the basis of ‘one member, one vote’ (OMOV). Ed 
Miliband’s success depended upon trade union support in section three of the electoral college:  he 
trailed David in sections one (MPs and MEPs) and two (individual party members). Accordingly the 
contest raised issues about what was the appropriate role of trade union interventions in shaping 
Labour party politics. Subsequently, two scholars disputed the impact of organised affiliates on the 
outcome, arguing that Ed Miliband’s victory owed much to the second preference votes of members 
of parliament (MPs/MEPs) and individual party members in other sections of the electoral college 
(Dorey and Denham, 2011). Another account, by contrast, suggested that trade union nominations 
and conduct of the vote had shaped the voting in section three (Jobson and Wickham-Jones, 2011). 
Critics of this position countered that trade union nominations were simply a recommendation to an 
organisation’s members who then voted as individuals (see Steel, 2010, 4; and Wintour, 2010, 8). 
Unlike MPs’ nominations, they played no formal part in the contest. Moreover, CLPs had exactly the 
same opportunity to make nominations at the start of the contest. After reform of the electoral 
college in 1993, many commentators had concluded such nominations to be irrelevant (for 
discussion of the reformed arrangements see Alderman and Carter, 1995; Quinn, 2004; Russell, 
2005; Katwala, 2010; and Jobson and Wickham-Jones, 2011, 324). 
 
The role of organised Labour was not the only contentious aspect of the 2010 leadership election. At 
the start of the contest, much criticism had been made of the background of the most plausible 
candidates – white, forty-something year old, Oxbridge educated, middle class, male career 
politicians. Diane Abbott had emerged as a fifth candidate, narrowly achieving the threshold of 
supporting nominations necessary to be included on the ballot. (When there is a vacancy, as in 2010, 
candidates must be nominated by 12.5 per cent of the Parliamentary Labour Party, PLP.) Further 
issues concerned the differences that had emerged between Ed Miliband and his brother David 
during the campaign and the extent to which the contest was characterised as an ideological battle 
between two competing visions of the party’s future trajectory and, for that matter, two contrasting 
interpretations of its past, in terms of its relationship with New Labour (Jobson and Wickham-Jones, 
2010). 
 
In this article, we build on earlier accounts of Labour’s electoral college. In two pieces published in 
Parliamentary Affairs, for example, Henry Drucker offered a detailed outline of the new 
arrangements adopted by the Labour party. In the first he charted the origins of the college during 
the factious conflicts of the late 1970s and early 1980s and indicated how such a structure placed 
the party’s leader under increased pressure (Drucker, 1981). In the second he outlined the operation 
of the new format in the 1983 leadership and deputy leadership contests. Drawing on the 
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nominations for the two posts and on the distribution of votes, he was able to identify some 
statistical patterns in the results. In the deputy leadership contest, while there was stability amongst 
recommendations made by unions and MPs, there was a degree of instability among nominations by 
Constituency Labour Parties (CLPs) (Drucker, 1984, 296). Some CLPs voted for candidates they had 
not nominated and vice versa. There was also something of an ideological shift between the 1981 
deputy leadership contest and that held in 1983 as around 40 per cent of Tony Benn’s support 
among CLPs went to the rightwing candidate in the latter contest, Roy Hattersley. Drucker concluded 
that the new arrangements had increased party stability, but noted that the possibility remained 
that a leader might be elected without winning in all three sections and that ‘such a result would not 
[be] a comfortable one’ (Drucker 1983, 299). Malcolm Punnett, again in Parliamentary Affairs, 
detailed the operation of the college in 1988, noting the pressure to reform the process by which 
unions and members voted (Punnett, 1990; see also Punnett, 1993). He emphasised the resistance 
to the introduction of one member, one vote in the CLPs, because it could dilute the power of 
activists and thus potentially privilege ‘moderate’ leadership candidates, and in union affiliates 
because it would compromise union leaderships’ power over the party derived from their ability to 
strike bargains on behalf of their members (Punnett 1990, 190, 194). Subsequent papers, once more 
in this journal, reviewed contests in 1992 and 1994, without examining in detail any statistical voting 
patterns (Alderman and Carter, 1993; and Alderman and Carter, 1995). Following Punnett’s 
indication that reform would be likely to have unintended consequences, Quinn later concluded that 
the electoral college had strengthened incumbent leaders, allowing them to reach over the heads of 
activists and union leaders to more moderate members (Quinn, 2005, see also Heppell 2010, 204-
205).  
 
Here, we detail the nominations of candidates in the 2010 contest, and go on to examine in detail 
the pattern of voting and its relationship to those nominations in all three sections of the electoral 
college. Our statistical approach is in marked contrast to that adopted by Dorey and Denham and 
that offered by Jobson and Wickham-Jones as well as that contained in previous studies of 
leadership contests noted above. We mine the surprisingly rich data released by Labour on the 
exhaustive series of ballots conducted until one candidate reached a majority in 2010. The data 
included full details of MPs’ and MEPs’ preference orderings; the outcome of first preference votes 
by members on a constituency by constituency basis; and the distribution of the votes from each 
affiliate among the five candidates. The detail provided went well beyond that offered for the two 
previous operations of the electoral college since the introduction of OMOV in 1993. In 1994 only 
first preference votes in section one were published and only percentages in sections two and three 
(Labour party, 1994, 8, 81-92); in 2007 only a basic summary of the result was distributed (Labour 
party, 2007). The party had also published, as had been the case in 1994 and 2007, a full list of 
nominations from MPs, MEPs, constituency Labour parties (CLPs) and affiliated organisations as part 
of the candidates’ statement that went to every participant in the election (Labour party, 2010b).  
We make comprehensive use of this data across all three sections of the electoral college. 
 
The article proceeds as follows. In the next section we discuss nominations and examine any 
configurations that emerged from this process. In three subsequent sections we analyse each 
section of the electoral college in turn: MPs and MEPs, followed by individual party members, and 
finally affiliated members. Throughout our focus is on the statistics of the outcome: for reasons of 
space, we address neither the arguments marshalled by candidates nor the techniques (frequently 
inspired by Barack Obama) by which they tried to win votes.  We unpack the outcome looking for 
patterns of preferences and for internal tensions within the electoral college.  
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II Formal nominations 
On 18 May 2010, Labour’s National Executive Committee (NEC), the body nominally responsible for 
running the party outside parliament, decided, in a break with immediate precedent, that the 
leadership would be resolved the day before the annual conference, to be held in Manchester in late 
September (Black, 2010). The last three contested elections to the leadership and deputy leadership 
occasions, held in 1992, 1994, and 2007, had been determined at special conferences after a few 
weeks of campaigning. On this occasion, it was decided to revert to the original practice followed by 
the party of using the electoral college just before the annual conference (as had happened in 1981, 
1983, and 1988). Accordingly, the entire summer of 2010 was spent campaigning on the succession 
to Gordon Brown. 
 
Securing nomination for the Labour party leadership, even when there is a vacancy, is by no means 
straightforward. Candidates must be nominated by fellow members of the PLP (Labour party, 2008, 
24). Following what many perceived to be a frivolous and potentially divisive challenge by Tony Benn 
to the incumbent Neil Kinnock in 1988, the threshold for nomination was raised from 5 per cent of 
the PLP to 20 per cent (Heppell, 2010, 142). In 1993, the figure was subsequently lowered, in the 
event of a vacancy, to 12.5 per cent. Nonetheless, following Benn's 1988 doomed adventure, there 
had been no leftwing candidate at successive elections for either the leadership or the deputy 
leadership in 1992, 1994 and 2007 (with the arguable exception of Jon Cruddas in the latter contest) 
for those on the left of the party were unable to pass the required threshold, an apparent indication 
of their lack of power. In 2010 any candidate needed the endorsement of 33 MPs to meet the 12.5 
per cent threshold. CLPs and affiliates could also nominate. But unlike MPs’ nominations, such 
recommendations played no formal part in the contest. They were not part of the threshold of 
support that an aspiring candidate needed to meet. 
 
A number of potential candidates put themselves forward when Gordon Brown resigned following 
the party’s loss of the 2010 general election. On 12 May 2010, just days after the defeat, David 
Miliband was the first to declare (Baldwin, 2010a, 15). From the start, he was widely perceived to be 
the frontrunner in public opinion polls and by bookmakers (Kirkup and Prince, 2010; and The 
Economist, 2010). He was closely identified with former premier Tony Blair, having headed his policy 
unit during Labour’s first term in government between 1997 and 2001. Three days after David's 
announcement, he was joined by his brother, Ed Miliband (Stratton, 2010a, 9). They had been on 
separate sides of the Blair-Brown division that had fractured the party so badly in office: Ed Miliband 
had worked as a policy adviser for Gordon Brown for a long period after 1994. The younger Miliband 
was less experienced, having only entered the government in 2006, four years after his brother. 
However his performance at recent Labour conferences at which he had adopted a high profile, one 
that extended far outside his departmental brief, was a clear indication of his wider aspirations. 
 
A few days later, the two Milibands were joined by other aspiring candidates, as Ed Balls, John 
McDonnell (a left-winger), Andy Burnham and Diane Abbott (another member of the party’s left) in 
turn declared themselves as candidates (see, amongst others, Stratton and Curtis, 2010, 15). Ed Balls 
was perceived to be even closer to Gordon Brown than Ed Miliband, working as chief economic 
adviser to the Treasury before becoming an MP and serving as Secretary of State for Children, 
Schools and Families under Brown. Andy Burnham, the former Secretary of State for Health, was 
another career politician.  
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However, while the Miliband brothers separately cleared the hurdle of 33 MPs to enter the formal 
contest, the other potential contestants initially struggled to meet the 12.5 per cent threshold. 
Eventually Ed Balls and Andy Burnham scraped over the line, each with precisely 33 MPs supporting 
them (the latter right on the deadline). The two candidates perceived to be on the left of the party 
both found the going even tougher. One day before nominations closed, McDonnell had 16 
nominations, while Abbott had just 11 (Stratton, 2010b, 2). Not only was the left's vote split 
between them, it appeared to be so marginalised that, even taken together, their combined support 
would fall well short of that required for a nomination.  
 
At this point there was much criticism that, in a party committed to encouraging diversity and 
equality of participation, all the potential candidates for the Labour leadership would be 40-
something year old middle class white men, educated at Oxbridge,  who had moved on to become 
political advisers and worked their way up in the party. Three of the candidates, Balls, Burnham and 
David Miliband had even played football for the same team, Demon Eyes, in the London Thames 
League during the late 1990s (Miliband, 2011). Then, in an extraordinary last day of nominations, the 
pattern changed dramatically (Stratton, 2010c). The rules of the contest allowed MPs who had 
lodged recommendations with the party to withdraw that backing and give it to another candidate. 
Accordingly, McDonnell pulled out of the contest and many of his supporters, but not all, went over 
to Abbott, who had entered the contest specifically to produce ‘a more diverse range of candidates’ 
(Baldwin, 2010b). Nonetheless, Abbott was still some way off crossing the 12.5 per cent threshold. 
She had already received some surprising nominations (in political terms) including those from David 
Lammy and Keith Vaz, neither of whom would be regarded as the left’s natural bedfellows. Just 
before nominations closed, she then received a flood of support from unlikely quarters including 
Chris Bryant, Harriet Harman, Tony Lloyd, Denis MacShane, Jack Straw, and, most surprisingly of all, 
one of the other candidates, David Miliband. None of these were on the left of the party. It would be 
hard to avoid the conclusion that, stung by such criticism that the party was excluding particular 
candidatures, leading figures had artificially expanded the contest. Supporters of David Miliband 
may also have calculated that having a leftwing candidate in the form of Abbott was a useful way to 
outflank the positions that his brother and Ed Balls, both perceived as being more radical, would 
take during the long campaign. Nominations for David Miliband had fallen on the final day as some 
of his supporters reallocated their backing: on which point, we note that Jobson and Wickham-
Jones, 2011, drawing on press coverage at the time, wrongly attribute the number of MPs endorsing 
the former foreign secretary. 
 
Table 1: Nominations, 2010 Labour leadership contest 
Candidate MPs MEPs CLPs Affiliates 
Abbott, Diane 33 0 20 3 
Balls, Ed 33 0 17 1 
Burnham, Andy 33 1 45 1 
Miliband, David 81 6 165 3 
Miliband, Ed 63 6 151 9 
Did not nominate 14 0 234 14 
Source: Labour party, 2010b 
 
When nominations closed there were, accordingly, five candidates. In terms of support David 
Miliband led amongst MPs (the formal part of the process) and amongst CLPs, followed in both 
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these sections by his brother Ed (see Table 1 above). Ed led in the third section amongst affiliates, in 
particular drawing support from the largest trade unions. Perhaps most strikingly, three of the 
candidates had only just secured the minimum level of support from MPs formally necessary to 
enter the contest. We see this as an indication of a manipulative arrangement designed to bring at 
least one, if not more, of the candidates into the contest so as to provide a more diverse selection of 
leadership contenders.   
 
We note that there was a regional dimension to the pattern of these nominations, particularly for 
the less well supported candidates. Andy Burnham received over a third of his nominations from 
MPs and over 40 per cent of his constituency recommendations from local parties based in the 
North West where his parliamentary seat, Leigh, is located. Just under a third of Diane Abbott’s 
nominations from MPs were from London (she is an MP for Hackney) though she did less well 
amongst local parties in the capital. David Miliband received strong backing from MPs in the North-
East (his constituency is South Shields). But he also took nearly half the nominations from Scottish 
MPs. He received more support from Yorkshire MPs than any other candidate despite both his 
brother and Ed Balls having constituencies there. Both Miliband brothers performed strongly in the 
East Midlands, London, Wales and the West Midlands with roughly equal number of nominations 
from MPs. In terms of CLPs’ backing, Ed performed well in East Anglia, London, South West and 
Wales as well as his home base of Yorkshire. In all, David Miliband led in six regions to Ed’s five. 
Between them, they led in all the regions bar one. Northern Irish constituencies (merged for the 
purposes of Labour party membership and lacking a single Labour MP) nominated Andy Burnham, 
the first such nomination in a Labour leadership election. At the CLP level, therefore, this already 
appeared an essentially two horse race between the Miliband brothers. 
 
 
III  Voting amongst MPs and MEPs 
270 ballots were distributed in the first section of Labour’s electoral college to MPs and MEPs (one 
member of the PLP elected in May 2010 had had the whip withdrawn because of the expenses 
scandal). Four MPs did not vote: Gordon Brown (former leader), Harriet Harman (acting leader), Nick 
Brown (chief whip) and Tony Lloyd (chair of the PLP). Four other MPs dropped out during successive 
rounds: two candidates (Diane Abbott and Ed Balls), one aspiring candidate (John McDonnell) and 
the partner of a candidate (Yvette Cooper). Abbott and Balls respectively voted for themselves 
alone; Cooper voted only for Balls; McDonnell just for Abbott. Every other member of section one 
voted for either of the Miliband brothers at some stage and were included in the final calculation. 
Andy Burnham’s initial vote for himself then went to David Miliband (he put Ed third). David and Ed 
Miliband voted for each other as their second and only other preference. Fifty seven MPs or MEPs 
stated only one preference: 53 of these were for David (31) or Ed (22). As can be seen in Table 3, 
David Miliband, closely followed by his brother Ed, dominated voting amongst MPs and MEPs. 
Gaining 42 per cent of the votes cast as first preferences, David went on to win this section by 140 
ballots to 122 in the final round. 
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Table 3: Voting by MPs and MEPs, round by round, 2010 Labour leadership contest 
Round 
Candidate 
1 2 3 4 
Abbott 7    
Balls 40 41 43  
Burnham 24 24   
Miliband David 111 111 125 140 
Miliband Ed 84 88 96 122 
Total 266 264 264 262 
Did not vote 4 6 6 8 
Source: Labour party, 2010a 
 
Table 4 gives the distribution of preferences and, in the process, emphasises the Milibands’ 
collective dominance of the PLP. Only 95 MPs mapped out explicitly their full ordering of preferences 
including last place. The vast majority of those that did (81 in all) placed Diane Abbott last. But the 
fourth preferences are also revealing. Andy Burnham got more than twice as many fourth 
preferences as he did first. Ed Balls got nearly the same number of fourth and first preferences. 
Implied preferences (adding a fifth choice where a candidate made four rankings) are given in the 
last column of Table 4. All but one of these 26 implied last preferences were for Diane Abbott, 
making her the last choice of 106 of 121 MPs whose full preference choice can be identified. 
 
Table 4: Preference ranking of candidates by MPs and MEPs, 2010 Labour leadership contest 
Preference 
 
Candidate  
1 2 3 4 5 5 
including 
implied 
last 
Abbott 7 4 4 9 81 106 
Balls 40 38 40 38 3 3 
Burnham 24 28 33 55 6 7 
Miliband, David 111 61 28 9 4 4 
Miliband, Ed 84 74 40 10 1 1 
Total 266 205 145 121 95 121 
Source: Labour party, 2010a 
 
Many members of the first section of the electoral college voted for both Miliband brothers in their 
first or second preferences (see Table 5 below). The number of combined first and second 
preference votes going to Ed and David, 72, is an indication that potentially there was not as great 
an ideological split between the brothers as was perceived to be the case in press reports. 
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Table 5: MPs and MEPs voting for David Miliband or Ed Miliband as their first or second 
preference, 2010 Labour leadership contest  
Second 
preference 
First  
preference 
Miliband, David Miliband, Ed Other candidate Total 
Miliband, David xxx 40 37 77 
Miliband, Ed 32 xxx 29 61 
Other candidate 29 34 4 67 
Source: Labour party, 2010a 
 
MPs’ nominations and voting 
The data on MPs’ voting indicates the fluidity of nominations made over three months earlier in June 
2010 (far more than that identified in 1983 by Drucker, 1984, 296). Nominations were made by 243 
MPs (see Table 1 above). When voting closed in September, 42 of these had shifted allegiance (see 
Table 6 below). Over 17 per cent of the PLP did not vote for the candidate they nominated. Diane 
Abbott lost 26 of her 33 nominees. Two did not vote (Harriet Harman as acting leader and Tony 
Lloyd as chair of the PLP) but the remainder voted for other candidates (many for David Miliband). 
The paucity of Abbott’s support among the PLP is clear, but so too is her lack of support on the left 
of the party as indicated by the voting of members of the Campaign Group. Formally founded in 
1982, the group represents the core of leftwing members of parliament and can be considered to be 
Abbott’s natural constituency. Of the 14 or so core members, however, four did not vote for Abbott 
at all, one put her last, another fourth, and one second. Manifestly, she did not get the combined 
votes of those who had been committed to a McDonnell candidacy back in May 2010 as well as her 
original supporters. In short, the viability of Diane Abbott’s candidacy was clearly doubtful. 
 
Table 6: Shifts between nominations and voting, Labour party leadership 
contest 2010 
 Nominations Flow of votes 
away 
Flow of votes to 
Abbott, Diane 33 26 0 
Balls, Ed 33 1 7 
Burnham, Andy 33 13 2 
Miliband, David 81 1 21 
Miliband. Ed 63 1 10 
Total 243 42 20 
Note: two nominating MPs, Harriet Harman Tony Lloyd and did not vote. 
Source: calculated from Labour party, 2010a and 2010b 
 
The distribution of votes in the PLP does not, however, raise question marks purely over the Abbott 
candidacy. Andy Burnham, too, lost considerable support overall. Having been nominated by 33 
MPs, he received the first preference votes of only 20 of those members of the PLP who had 
supported him back in June. Whilst he picked up two votes, he lost 13 during the course of the 
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campaign. Amongst the MPs who nominated him, one placed him last, two placed him fourth and 
one did not rank him: yet without their support he would not have reached the threshold of 
nominations and his candidacy would not have succeeded. It may be that this flow away from 
Abbott and Burnham is a product of the summer-long campaign. Alternatively, given the reasonable 
consistency of preferences amongst MPs and MEPs detected by YouGov (2010a) over the summer, 
we see evidence here of the deliberate attempt to widen the array of candidates at the time 
nominations closed, and of the limited boundaries of the PLP’s ideological terrain. 
 
 
IV Voting amongst individual party members 
The second section of Labour’s electoral college comprised 177,559 individual party members of 
whom just over 125,000 voted. At the end of the first round, David Miliband led in this section, with 
44.1 per cent of the ballots cast (see Table 7 below).2 By the final round, he received 54.4 per cent of 
the vote to Ed Miliband’s 45.6 per cent. Looking at the plurality of the vote, David’s dominance is 
clearer still. He  won outright in 540 constituencies (more than 85 per cent of the total) whereas Ed 
Miliband won outright in just 73 (12 per cent). The remaining CLPs were either ties (10 in total, all 
involving David Miliband) or distributed between the other candidates. Diane Abbott did not win a 
single constituency. In her own constituency of Hackney North and Stoke Newington she received 
merely 20.7 per cent, coming third behind the Milibands. Ed Balls led in just two constituencies: 
Morley and Outwood, his own, and Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford, that of his partner Yvette 
Cooper. Andy Burnham won only eight constituencies, seven of these in the North-West, his home 
region. In short, David was clearly the first preference of party members. 
 
Table 7: Individual party members’ votes, round by round, 2010 Labour leadership contest  
Round 
Candidate 
1 2 3 4 
Abbott, Diane 9,314    
Balls, Ed 12,831 14,510 18,114  
Burnham, Andy 10,844 12,498   
Miliband, David 55, 905 57,128 60,375 66,814 
Miliband, Ed 37,874 42,176 46,697 55,992 
Total valid votes 126,874 126,312 125, 186 122,806 
Source: Labour party, 2010a 
 
Was the membership vote shaped by partisan incumbency (i.e. by whether or not a constituency 
was represented by a Labour MP)? On the face of it, David Miliband might have been expected to do 
better in non-Labour seats given his apparent appeal towards the centre ground of British politics. 
By contrast, given their partisan positioning, the other candidates might be expected to do better in 
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constituencies held by the party.  However, the difference between the two types of seat was 
marginal: in seats not held by Labour David obtained 43.8 per cent of the vote and won the highest 
share of the vote in 88 per cent; in Labour seats the equivalent figures were 44.4 and 81 per cent 
respectively. Of course voters in Labour seats may have voted for David as the candidate best able to 
help the party win backs seats lost elsewhere in past elections.  Nonetheless, the pattern 
undermines the notion of an ideological split in the party membership. 
 
CLPs and geography 
Much of the distribution of the individual members’ votes across the regions was consistent (see 
Table 8 below). David Miliband topped the poll in every region. Only in three (Scotland and Yorkshire 
and Humberside alongside Northern Ireland) was his lead over his brother less than ten percentage 
points. In another indicator of consistency, Ed Miliband came second in every region with the 
exception of the small (in terms of Labour party membership) Northern Ireland. Burnham’s 
impressive performance in Northern Ireland may reflect the fact that he was the only candidate to 
visit the region during the contest, the proximity of his constituency, and perhaps also his 
Liverpudlian roots. 
 
Table 8: Percentage share of first preference votes, by region, 2010 Labour party leadership 
contest 
Region Abbott, 
Diane 
Balls,  
Ed 
Burnham, 
Andy 
Miliband, 
David 
Miliband, 
Ed 
Total 
East Anglia 9 12 6 45 29 100 
East Midlands 7 10 8 45 29 100 
London 9 8 5 46 31 100 
North East 5 9 7 53 26 100 
North West 6 8 19 41 25 100 
Northern Ireland 7 4 28 34 27 100 
Scotland 7 11 7 41 35 100 
South East 8 11 7 44 30 100 
South West 8 12 7 43 29 100 
Wales 6 11 7 44 32 100 
West Midlands 7 11 8 45 29 100 
Yorkshire and Humber-side  6 11 9 39 34 100 
Source: Labour party, 2010a 
 
The distribution of votes is perhaps most striking in London. In terms of nominations Ed Miliband 
had more support from MPs in London than David (11 to 10) and more nominations from CLPs (26 to 
18). It does not seem to have helped much with the popular vote which David won by 46 to 31 per 
cent, taking the highest share of the vote in every single London constituency, 70 in all. A germane 
contrast can be drawn here with the vote for the London mayoral candidate in 2010. In that contest, 
Ken Livingstone won over 65 per cent of the votes cast, giving him a majority over Oona King of 
more than 30 percentage points. The leftwing Livingstone received more votes than King in every 
single constituency in London. At the same time the moderate David Miliband won every London 
constituency in the leadership election. He had a lead over Ed of around 15 percentage points. A 
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considerable number of those voting must have voted a David Miliband/Ken Livingstone ticket for 
party leader and mayorial candidate respectively.  
 
Such a pattern of voting indicates a strong non-ideological aspect of the ballots for Labour leadership 
and mayorial candidate. That is, party members did not endorse ideological consistency in endorsing 
either a David Miliband-King alignment or an Ed Miliband-Livingstone one. Further support for this 
conclusion is produced in polls by YouGov during the campaign which indicated that most party 
members were well to the left of David Miliband (see the discussion in Quinn, 2012). Nearly 90 per 
cent of party members perceived themselves to be leftwing, in one shade or another. Yet David was 
located within the centre ground of the party (alongside less than 10 per cent of its members). 53 
per cent of party members saw themselves as either very or fairly leftwing: only 5 per cent regarded 
David in a similar way. 
 
The impact of CLP nominations on voting 
Just under 400 constituencies had taken the opportunity to nominate for the contest (see Table 1 
above). The Miliband brothers took nearly 80 per cent of these with David (165) edging out Ed (151). 
The remaining constituency nominations were divided between the other three candidates with Ed 
Balls getting least (17). On the face of it, such constituency nominations from June had little impact 
on the voting that took place in September 2010. 82 constituencies nominated Abbott, Balls or 
Burnham but they came top (or tied first) in just 11 constituencies (none of which had nominated 
another candidate). Abbott did not win a single constituency that nominated her. Balls won just two. 
In many cases nominations appear to reflect the collective view of either local oligarchies and or a 
hard-core of committed activists who were able to make the decision to recommend a candidate 
without delivering the votes of individual members or apparently even shaping their outlook in a 
discernable fashion (see Table 9 below). Remarkably, twelve constituencies nominated a candidate 
who then got less than ten votes from the local members. Diane Abbott was nominated by 20 
constituencies but received less than 25 votes in 15 of these. Andy Burnham picked up less than 25 
votes in nearly half of the constituencies (21 out of 45) that nominated him. It is a striking feature of 
David Miliband’s domination of the CLP vote that he received more than 40 per cent of first 
preferences in all but 23 of the 165 seats that nominated him. By contrast, his brother Ed managed 
that threshold in only 21 out of 151 seats. The value of nominations is also questioned when 
consideration is given to the number of constituencies that made a recommendation only for those 
members to vote in a different manner. David failed to win a plurality of the votes in only six seats 
that supported him. For Ed, the figure is well over 100. 
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Table 9: No of nominating CLPs in which candidates failed to clear a threshold of votes or share of 
the vote, 2010 Labour party leadership contest 
 Overall 
nominations 
Less than 
10 votes 
Less than 
35 votes 
Less than 
20 per cent 
Less than 
40 per cent 
Did not 
win 
Abbott, Diane 20 5 17 19 20 20 
Balls, Ed 17 1 8 7 16 15 
Burnham, Andy 45 6 28 29 41 38 
Miliband, David 165 0 3 0 23 6 
Miliband Ed 151 0 14 2 130 117 
Source: Labour party, 2010a and 2010b 
 
A similar pattern emerges from the overall vote amongst members. Table 10 indicates how each 
candidate did in terms of the share of the vote according to who that member’s constituency had 
nominated. All candidates did better in such constituencies, the three trailing candidates relatively 
better than the Milibands though not enough to raise their performance above that of the two 
brothers. Regardless of who nominated, as Table 10 indicates, David was the most popular 
candidate amongst members, whilst Ed was second. Only with those CLPs that nominated Ed 
Milband does David’s lead drop below thirteen per cent – falling to 8 per cent. 
 
Table 10: Percentage share of first preference votes by party members broken down by CLP 
nominations for candidates in nominating constituencies, 2010 Labour party leadership contest. 
 Share of first preference votes (per cent) 
CLP 
nomination: 
No. Abbott, 
Diane 
Balls, Ed Burnham, 
Andy 
Miliband, 
David 
Miliband, 
Ed 
All 
Abbott 20 11.8 8.4 7.2 43.0 29.6 100 
Balls 17 5.7 23.8 8.5 37.7 24.2 100 
Burnham 45 5.3 9.0 21.7 39.4 24.6 100 
Miliband, D. 165 6.6 9.3 7.8 49.5 26.8 100 
Miliband, E. 151 7.7 9.5 6.7 41.7 34.4 100 
Overall average 398 7.4 12.0 10.4 42.3 27.9   
Source:  Labour party 2010a and 2010b 
 
A further indication of the relative lack of impact of CLP nominations is given in Table 11 below 
which compares voting by members with opinion polls of the same electorate taken in July and 
September (see YouGov 2010a and Quinn, 2012). What is striking about the polls is their consistency 
over the period of the contest and, some minor variation aside, their relative accuracy with regard to 
the final result.  
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Table 11: Comparison of opinion polls of members with voting, 2010 Labour 
leadership contest 
 July poll 
(%) 
September poll 
(%) 
First round 
preferences (%) 
Abbott, Diane 13 11 7 
Balls, Ed 7 9 10 
Burnham, Andy 10 10 9 
Miliband, David 38 38 44 
Miliband, Ed 32 31 30 
Source: YouGov, 2010a; and Labour party, 2010a.  
 
 
V  Voting by affiliated members 
The third section of Labour’s electoral college consists of affiliates, which can broadly be divided into 
two types: trade unions and a plethora of general socialist groups. The former dominate the latter 
massively - in terms of ballots distributed, trade unions outnumbered the socialist societies by 
2,727,378 votes to 19,652. Of the 2.7 million votes distributed to the affiliates only just over 200,000 
valid votes were cast. Effective turnout was a miserable 7.7 per cent. As Table 12 below indicates, in 
contrast to the other sections of the electoral college, Ed Miliband led amongst affiliates from the 
first round onwards despite the fact that the ideological profile of union members and their 
perception of the candidates differed little from that of individual party members (Quinn, 2012, 
chapter 3). In the final round he received just under 60 per cent of the vote in this section. This was 
sufficient to overwhelm voting in the other two sections, thus securing him the leadership, but at the 
price of accusations that his victory lacked legitimacy and earning him the tag ‘Red Ed’ from some 
press commentators (see, for example, Milne 2010, Peev 2010; and Watson 2010) – something 
which he was forced to tackle head-on at the September 2010 conference. Ironically, the 
circumstances of his victory may have served to limit his utility to the unions as he subsequently 
strove to avoid appearing to be their creature – for example, proposing a plan that the voting power 
of the trade unions at the party’s annual conference be reduced (see Maguire, 2011; Stratton, 
Wintour and Charlton, 2011; and Walker 2011); a proposal vigorously and successfully opposed by 
the unions. 
 
Table 12: Voting by members of affiliates, round by round, 2010 Labour party leadership contest 
 1st round 2nd round 3rd round 4th round 
Abbott, Diane 25,938 - - - 
Balls, Ed 21,618 26,441 35,512 - 
Burnham, Andy 17,904 25,528 - - 
Miliband, David 58,189 61,336 66,889 80,266 
Miliband, Ed 87,585 95,335 102,882 119,405 
Total 211, 234 208,640 205,283 199,671 
Source: Labour party 2010a 
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There are currently 15 trade unions affiliated to the Labour party, far fewer than in the past. Three 
of these did not distribute ballots in the leadership election. Three unions, BECTU (Broadcasting, 
Entertainment, Cinematograph and Theatre Union), BFAWU (Bakers, Food and Allied Workers 
Union) and the Musicians' Union, did not nominate but did vote.  The remaining nine unions 
nominated and voted. There are sixteen socialist organisations affiliated to Labour, of which five 
nominated and voted while nine voted but did not nominate. In all, out of twenty-six affiliates that 
participated in voting, fourteen affiliates made recommendations that were printed in the candidate 
booklet whilst twelve did not.  
 
Overall, around 97 per cent of the electorate of this third section of the electoral college were 
members of bodies that made nominations. This figure reflects the domination of the section by the 
three biggest trade unions, Unite, GMB, and Unison, each of which had nominated and together 
represented just under 75 per cent of the total. With support from these unions and from UCATT, 
nearly 80% of trade union nominations, as a share of total membership, went to Ed Miliband. In 
terms of the overall electorate in this section, trade unionists represented over 99 per cent of the 
votes.   
 
How did nominations by affiliates shape the distribution of first preference votes for the five 
candidates?  Of the five affiliated societies that nominated, three voted in favour of that nominee. 
Ed Miliband won amongst the Labour disabled group and the Socialist Health Alliance, whilst David 
Miliband won a plurality of Labour students. But David also won amongst Black Asian Minority Ethnic 
(BAME) members who had nominated Diane Abbott and Labour Lawyers who had nominated Ed 
Miliband. On average the nominee received just 34.0 per cent amongst affiliated societies, in part a 
reflection of Diane Abbott’s poor vote amongst BAME members. 
 
Nomination mattered more amongst the affiliated unions. Nine unions nominated and carried out 
ballots: eight delivered a plurality of votes that corresponded to their recommendation to members 
(see Table 13 below). The single exception was TSSA (Transport Salaried Staffs Association), who 
endorsed Diane Abbott but whose members gave more votes to David Miliband. However, he beat 
Abbott by just 25 votes, around 0.1 per cent of the organisation’s membership, and his vote share 
was the lowest enjoyed by the leading candidate on the first ballot amongst any of Labour’s 
affiliated unions. Overall, 49.3 per cent of first preference votes were cast for a union’s nominee.  
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Table 13: Trade union nominations and leader on first preference votes, 2010 Labour party 
leadership contest 
Union Nominee Percentage 
secured by 
nominee 
Leader on first 
preferences 
Percentage  
secured by 
winner 
ASLEF Diane Abbott 50.4 Diane Abbott 50.4 
Community David Miliband 59.7 David Miliband 59.7 
CWU Ed Balls 45.2 Ed Balls 45.2 
GMB Ed Miliband 49.3 Ed Miliband 49.3 
TSSA Diane Abbott 30.5 David Miliband 31.3 
UCATT Ed MIliband 66.9 Ed Miliband 66.9 
Unison Ed Miliband 40.7 Ed Miliband 40.7 
Unite Ed Miliband 49.7 Ed Miliband 49.7 
USDAW David Miliband 64.2 David Miliband 64.2 
Average   49.3  49.3 
Source: Labour party 2010a and 2010b 
 
Amongst unions that did not nominate, the winner of the greatest share of the vote (David Miliband 
in the case of two, Diane Abbott in the case of the third) received on average 32 per cent of the vote 
– 17 percentage points less than was the mean for nominating unions. Amongst affiliated societies 
that did not nominate (all of which favoured either David or Ed Miliband) the winner received on 
average around 41 per cent of the vote. Overall, most union memberships voted with their union’s 
recommendation, the winner receiving on average around half the union’s vote. Where unions did 
not nominate, the winner of that body received a much lower share of around a third. For the 
affiliated societies, the outcome is more complex. Nominations do not seem to have favoured 
candidates in such a direct way, partly because of Diane Abbott performed badly amongst the 
membership of BAME which had nominated her. Perhaps surprisingly, here, the winner amongst 
socialist societies that did not nominate frequently performed better than the winner amongst those 
that did.  
 
Quite why union nominations should shape the distribution of votes so directly is uncertain. A 
generic alignment with the union leadership and a general allegiance to that body on the part of 
those taking part, as opposed to a specific endorsement of a candidate and their ideological position 
has been suggested to play a part (see Jobson and Wickham-Jones, 2011, 334-338). For the affiliated 
societies such generic loyalty would be far less important to a politically engaged membership, each 
of whom might make their own assessments of the different candidates. For some of the socialist 
societies, candidates may have had a strong identity with memberships thus effectively rendering 
any recommendation unnecessary. For example, Ed Miliband’s vote from SERA is unsurprising given 
its interest reflected his outgoing portfolio in the Labour government. 
  
We can get another sense of how trade union nominations shaped the 2010 Labour leadership 
contest by looking at the distribution of votes between the different candidates according to 
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whether the organisation nominated or not (Table 14 below). The very strong performance of Ed 
Miliband in nominating unions is manifest. The contrast with non-nominating unions is striking: in 
these unions David Miliband received more support. More noteworthy still is how much stronger 
Diane Abbott performed amongst the non-nominating unions, receiving 25.5 per cent of the vote. 
How representative is this outcome? Only three relatively small unions held ballots but did not make 
a recommendation. That is, did Diane Abbott perform well amongst these unions because of their 
atypical, radical nature? Or would she have done as well amongst other unions – had they taken the 
decision not to nominate? It is hard to give a categorical answer. The Musicians’ Union may not be a 
particularly typical representative of organised labour (and was wrongly stated in the press to have 
nominated Abbott – see Kettle, 2010). BECTU was engaged in an industrial dispute at the time of the 
leadership contest. Equally, however, in the absence of an official recommendation from their 
leadership, some active trade unionists may have been more prepared to cast their vote for the 
most radical candidate standing in the election – that is, for Diane Abbott. Accordingly, the decision 
not to nominate appears to have resulted in more radical votes (for Diane Abbott) and more 
moderate ones (for David Miliband), both at the expense of Ed Miliband. 
 
Table 14: First preference votes cast by union members, 2010 Labour party leadership contest 
A. Nominating Unions Ballots received Percentage share of the 
vote 
Ranking 
Abbott, Diane 23,388 11.9 3 
Balls, Ed 20,455 10.4 4 
Burnham, Andy 16,675 8.5 5 
Miliband, David 53,294 27.1 2 
Miliband, Ed 82,938 42.2 1 
Total 196,750   
B. Non-nominating 
unions 
   
Abbott, Diane 1,691 25.5 3 
Balls, Ed 567 8.6 5 
Burnham, Andy 574 8.7 4 
Miliband, David 2004 30.2 1 
Miliband, Ed 1793 27.0 2 
Total 6,629   
Source: Labour party 2010a and 2010b 
 
Evidence of the impact of union nominations is also to be found in the shifts in preferences of trade 
unionists during the summer (see Table 15 below, see also YouGov, 2010b and  2010c). YouGov 
polling indicated growing support for Ed Miliband, which can be attributed to the nominations and 
specific campaigning adopted by the unions. Of course, the swing might reflect the general impact of 
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Ed Miliband’s campaign but it is worth noting that it was not replicated amongst party members 
(Table 11 above).  
 
Table 15: Polling of trade unionists and first round voting, 2010 Labour leadership contest 
 July 2010 
% 
September 2010 
% 
First round 
% 
Abbott, Diane 17 12 12 
Balls, Ed 11 9 10 
Burnham, Andy 13 14 8 
Miliband, David 34 29 28 
Miliband, Ed 26 36 41 
Source: YouGov, 2010a and Labour party 2010a 
 
 
VI Conclusions 
The 2010 contest for the Labour party leadership was a long and drawn out affair, one that 
culminated in gripping circumstances with an extremely close victory for Ed Miliband. In this article, 
drawing on the data provided by the party, we have unpacked the statistics of the result with regard 
to each section of the electoral college in terms of nominations, first preferences, and overall voting. 
In the process, we hope to have demonstrated just how cumbersome the procedures to elect the 
Labour leader are. Indeed, in analysing the data made available by Labour we think we have 
detected an error in the results published by the party. The total vote of individual members 
allocated to David Miliband put out by the party is 66,814. Having checked our data several times, 
our analysis indicates he received one vote less. To be sure, this amount is trivial to say the least and 
does not impact on the already miniscule size of Ed Miliband’s majority. It is, however, an indication 
of the problematic and complex character of the electoral college. 
 
In conclusion, a number of issues arising from our discussion demand emphasis. First, the link 
between nominations and voting by MPs was extremely fluid and shifts in allegiance during the 
campaign were significant. Diane Abbott’s candidacy was the result of manipulations within the PLP 
in the sense that she had minimal genuine backing from Labour MPs. Abbott’s candidacy gave the 
contest greater diversity of candidates and facilitated discussion of a wider range of issues by 
injecting the left’s voice into debate. It is much less certain whether it was a substantive campaign. 
Andy Burnham’s campaign also struggled to clear the formal threshold of support from the PLP that 
was necessary for him to be placed on the ballot paper. Our understanding is that some MPs made 
clear to him at the time of nominations that they would be extremely unlikely to give him a first 
preference in September. Likewise Ed Balls only just cleared the hurdle of nominations (though he 
picked up votes from MPs during the campaign). His relatively low personal vote from the members 
of his own constituency, in contrast to that attained by Burnham and the Milibands, may also be 
telling evidence of a candidate lacking sustained support. In effect, therefore, the 2010 Labour 
leadership contest was from the start a two-horse race. As Dorey and Denham (2011) note, Ed 
Miliband’s victory owed much to second and subsequent preferences as ballots were redistributed: 
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though given that David led on the first ballot only to lose on the fourth round of preferences, such a 
condition must axiomatically be the case. 
 
The fact that some candidates had minimal support from the PLP despite reaching the nomination 
threshold must raise question marks about their place in their campaign. However successful they 
may have been in raising issues, such candidacies were not plausible given the rules of the contest. 
Labour may well have issues concerning the socio-economic and political narrowness of its pool of 
potential leadership candidates. In retrospect, artificial manipulations of the formal rules do not 
appear to be a solution to that problem given the evidence here of the negligible support such 
candidates will receive in formal voting. 
 
Second, the analysis of voting in sections one and two of the electoral college, made of up of MPs 
and MEPs, and individual party members respectively, confirms the dominance of David Miliband 
across those sections of the party. The ideological positioning of party members obtained by opinion 
polling indicates that his support did not reflect either political issues or specific proposals. David 
scored highly compared to the other candidates on issues of competence and electability (Quinn, 
2012).  In these sections, one is struck by the virtual absence of ideology from the detectable voting 
patterns. This conclusion confirms the point made by Patrick Seyd and Paul Whiteley (2002, 168) 
that New Labour’s members placed considerable emphasis on electoral success and its 
preconditions alongside any ideological commitments they might have. In this context, the non-
ideological pattern of votes in London (with many David Miliband supporters backing the left-wing 
Ken Livingstone as mayoral candidate) is especially noteworthy. (Of course, the Milibands set out 
varied policy positions during the long campaign. Such differences did not shape an ideological 
chasm in voting.) 
 
Third, we have examined the role of nominations offered by constituency parties in section two of 
the electoral college. We have noted the limited impact that these had on the electoral process, with 
David Miliband dominating all types of constituency regardless as to who they nominated. In many 
cases, constituency nominations appear to have been made by local oligarchies and committed 
activists that had little impact on the final vote of the members within those localities. This 
conclusion may reflect on the current state of many local Labour parties after a decade or so of 
falling membership and general political inactivity. 
 
Fourth, by contrast with CLP recommendations, we have shown the role that nominations played in 
the third section of the electoral college, that made up of affiliated members. Work by Jobson and 
Wickham-Jones (2011) has offered an account as to how trade union nominations and campaigning 
played a part in the electoral process. The statistical data provided here gives substantive evidence 
backing up their argument, demonstrating that trade union nominations shaped the pattern of first 
preference votes in favour of Ed Miliband. In particular, we are able to contrast how nominations by 
trade unions had more impact than the recommendations offered by constituency parties. Where 
trade unions nominated, 49 per cent of affiliated members followed that guidance. Where 
constituency parties nominated, 38 per cent of individual members went along with that 
recommendation. More relevant still, the contrast between unions that nominated and those that 
did not is much greater than that for constituency parties (or socialist societies).   Given the 
ideological similarities between members of the two groups (noted above), we conclude that the 
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sharp differences between the voting of CLP members and trade unionists reflect the impact that 
union nominations had on the latter. 
 
Overall, on the basis of the available data, we find that the long campaign shaped the different 
sections of the electoral college in distinct ways. Individual party members appear to have been 
most consistent in their support for candidates. At the same time some MPs shifted away from their 
nominations while affiliated members modified their alignment in response to union 
recommendations and intense campaigning.   
 
 
We end with an observation about the efficiency of the party’s procedures for electing its leader. 
Labour’s electoral college was designed in arbitrary circumstance during the conflicts that engulfed 
the party in the early 1980s. Following its establishment, scholars and participants alike defended it 
in functional terms (see, for example, Minkin, 1991). Trade union participation in the election of the 
Labour leader, it was argued, allowed affiliates to perform a stabilising role in a party whose 
parliamentary elite and members might be at loggerheads. Our analysis of the voting patterns in the 
2010 leadership contest demonstrates categorically that the procedure is no longer fulfilling such a 
task. Instead union voting was notably at odds with voting in the other two sections, not least 
because union members were heavily influenced by their leaderships in the context of an 
increasingly concentrated movement dominated by a few super unions. The result was the election 
of a leader who was not the first choice of either the parliamentary party or of party members and 
whose legitimacy was therefore immediately in question. Manifestly, the 2010 leadership contest 
has raised significant questions about the practical viability and normative desirability of the 
electoral college.  
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1
. We are grateful to the anonymous referees of this journal as well as its editor Philip Cowley and Richard 
Jobson for their comments on a draft: responsibility is ours. 
2 For the purposes of this analysis, the Northern Irish constituencies are conflated into a single seat, 
as they are for Labour party membership, giving a total of 633 seats altogether. Other than in Table 
12, we have also excluded from this data party members living abroad and those for whom no 
address was given.  
 
